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Abstract
We argue that the positive impact of economic development on generalized trust
is likely to be undermined by income inequality. Our empirical evidence, based on
a panel of up to 89 countries, provides robust support for this assertion.
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1 Introduction
By reducing transaction costs in economic and political exchange, generalized trust can
contribute towards economic development and the quality of governance (see Algan and
Cahuc, 2014 for a review). Because of this, scholars have attempted to identify the
determinants of generalized trust uncovering the role of several variables including the
level and distribution of income, ethnic or racial heterogeneity and religion (Nannestad,
2008 reviews related work).
We revisit the role of income. Higher average income should contribute towards gen-
eralized trust. Individuals rely on identifiable in-groups to reduce uncertainty in social
interaction (Kyriacou, 2005; Efferson et al., 2008). In settings of resource scarcity, un-
certainty is greater, thereby increasing in-group bias to the detriment of out-group inter-
actions (Banfield, 1958; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). From this vantage point, resource
scarcity is likely to contribute towards the emergence of particularized or within-group
trust. Conversely, higher income reduces the rationality of in-group bias thus facilitating
the emergence of generalized trust.
Similarly, income inequality may undermine generalized trust because it increases un-
certainty in social interaction. Social heterogeneity, of which income inequality is one
dimension, makes it more difficult to predict the behavior of others and so increases the
rationality of particularized trust. Indeed, in unequal settings, relatively wealth indi-
viduals may expect relatively poorer ones to defect from cooperative agreements that
perpetuate the status quo, thus reducing generalized trust (Boix and Posner, 1998).
Previous work has reported the positive association between the level of income and
generalized trust and/or the negative relationship between inequality and trust (for ex-
ample, Knack and Keefer, 1997; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Delhey and Newton, 2005;
Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005; Bjørnskov, 2007; Leigh, 2006; Barone and Mocetti, 2016).
To date, existing work has not examined how income inequality can mediate the impact
of income per capita on generalized trust. We expect the positive impact of income per
capita to be reduced in settings of higher income inequality. While rising average incomes
should reduce societal uncertainty thus facilitating the emergence of generalized trust,
income inequality increases uncertainty in social interaction thus hindering trust. It is to
the empirical exploration of this hypothesis that we dedicate the rest of this article. In
the next section we describe the data and empirical methodology. We follow this with
our empirical findings before concluding.
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2 Data and empirical methodology
To measure generalized trust we turn to the World Value Surveys database (WVS) and
compute the share of people who think that “most people can be trusted”. Real GDP
per capita is obtained from the World Development Indicators, while our inequality mea-
sure is the disposable income Gini index from the Standardized World Income Inequality
database.
Rather than rely on cross-country estimations like most previous work, we turn to
panel data techniques. We use five-years averages to estimate an unbalanced panel over
the period 1981 to 2014. More specifically, we estimate the following regression:
Trustit = β1 ln(GDPpc)it + β2Giniit + β3 ln(GDPpc)it ∗Giniit + β4xit + µt + φj + it, (1)
where beyond our variables of interest, xit is a vector of control variables, µt and φj
represent time and region fixed-effects, and it is a random error term.
Given the limited within-country variation in our key variables, our estimation strategy
exploits both the within and the between variation. To reduce omitted variable bias
we include time and regional fixed-effects along with a set of standard country-specific
controls. To account for reverse causality, we also apply 2SLS. We instrument GDP per
capita through (five year) lagged values of this variable and income inequality through
the size of mature cohorts (You and Khagram, 2005; Leigh, 2006) and the logarithm of
the ratio between the land surface suitable for wheat over that suitable for the prodution
of sugar (Easterly, 2007). The interaction term is instrumented by the product of the
lagged values of GDP per capita and cohort size.1
3 Results
Table 1 presents the results from the estimation of equation (1). Columns [1] and [2] show
the impact of GDP and inequality on generalized trust when the variables are considered
independent of each other. We confirm the opposite impact of economic development and
inequality on trust found in the literature. The latter, however, is not estimated with
precision when the full set of controls is included.
In columns [3]-[10] we consider how inequality mediates the impact of economic de-
velopment on trust: columns [3]-[6] show OLS results while columns [7]-[10] display 2SLS
regressions. In both cases, the analysis goes from the most parsimonious estimation where,
1Controlling for the share of the population above 65 years of age as we do below, has the salutary
effect of reinforcing the exclusion restriction of the cohort-based instruments since previous work has
shown that generalized trust increases with age (for example, Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002).
3
Table 1: Regression Results
Dependent variable:
Trust
OLS 2SLS
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
ln(GDPpc)it 4.066 3.678 18.306 10.605 13.184 13.216 8.076 38.311 31.005 28.293
(1.327)*** (1.830)** (4.545)*** (4.667)** (5.111)** (5.213)** (2.186)*** (11.794)*** (11.480)*** (15.585)*
Giniit -0.212 -0.243 3.531 1.302 2.38 2.065 0.864 6.876 4.701 4.241
(0.124)* (0.179) (1.127)*** (1.005) (1.113)** (1.212)* (0.643) (2.985)** (2.689)* (4.261)
ln(GDPpc)it*Giniit -0.431 -0.177 -0.303 -0.267 -0.202 -0.838 -0.658 -0.576
(0.126)*** (0.119) (0.133)** (0.142)* (0.116)* (0.322)** (0.315)** (0.460)
ln(Population)it 1.912 2.2 2.209 4.06 5.421
(0.831)** (0.683)*** (0.867)** (1.727)** (1.792)***
Retired shareit 0.695 0.579 0.706 0.178 0.825
(0.267)** (0.272)** (0.272)** (0.464) (0.522)
Years. sec. schoolit -0.846 0.531 -0.83 -0.502 -0.697
(1.114) (1.263) (1.109) (2.283) (2.212)
ICRG-Government qualityit 0.071 0.048 0.024
(0.088) (0.086) (0.154)
Trade shareit 0.0001 0.006 0.097
(0.028) (0.028) (0.069)
Ethnic fragmentationi 0.022 0.033 0.019
(0.039) (0.039) (0.055)
Urban shareit -0.076 -0.027 -0.024
(0.092) (0.084) (0.270)
Number Id 80 67 89 80 71 67 47 46 40 39
Observations 205 176 218 205 186 176 92 91 83 82
R-squared 0.65 0.73 0.45 0.66 0.7 0.74 0.85 0.64 0.67 0.73
Hansen p-values 0.7001 0.7295 0.5711 0.4885
Region FE 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Time FE 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Religion controls 3 3 7 3 3 3 7 3 3 3
Legal controls 3 3 7 3 3 3 7 3 3 3
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate coefficients are significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respec-
tively. 2SLS: Endogenous variables: ln(GDPpc)it, Giniit, ln(GDPpc)it*Giniit. External instruments: ln(GDPpc)it−1, Cohortit−1,
ln(GDPpc)it−1*Cohortit−1, Wheat-Sugari. We employ lagged values of the remaining time variant variables.
beyond our variables of interest, only time and region fixed-effects are included (columns
[3] and [7]), to the most saturated regression that further includes a full set of control
variables.2 Our sample goes from a maximum of 89 countries (column [3]) to a minimum
of 39 (column [10]).3
Despite the changes in the number of countries, we observe a robust pattern in our
variables of interest. We always find that GDP per capita is positively associated with
generalized trust while the interaction term is always negative. To consider the impact of
economic development on trust for different values of inequality we compute the marginal
effect of the former on trust (along with associated standard errors) for a relevant range
of values of the Gini index. Figure 1 presents the estimated marginal effects. Figures 1.a
and 1.b show the marginal effects computed, respectively, from columns [6] and [10] in
Table 1.4
2The Hansen p-values indicate that the instruments are valid, i.e. we do not reject the joint null hy-
pothesis that they are uncorrelated with the error term, and excluded instruments are correctly excluded
from the estimated equation.
3All regressions included a balanced number of developed and developing countries, sample informa-
tion is available upon request.
4The marginal effects are robust along the different specifications. We show the results from the
most saturated regression. Marginal effects from the other specifications are available upon request. The
fact that the interaction term or any of its individual components are not statistically significant in the
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Figure 1: Marginal Effects
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Notes: OLS and 2SLS marginal effects are computed, respectively, from columns [6] and [10] in Table 1. 90% Confidence intervals.
Both figures show the same pattern. Economic development has a positive impact
on trust, but this depends on the level of inequality. Income inequality mitigates the
positive impact of GDP per capita on generalized trust. Our results show that for values
of the Gini index larger than 40, a greater GDP per capita does not have a statistically
significant impact on generalized trust.
4 Conclusion
Economic development has a positive impact on generalized trust because it relaxes
scarcity constraints that otherwise drive individuals into the arms of identified in-groups
to the detriment of out-group interactions. We hypothesize that the positive effect of
development on generalized trust will be mitigated by income inequality since the latter -
by increasing social heterogeneity and thus uncertainty in social interaction - increases the
rationality of in-group bias. Our empirical evidence, based on a panel of up to 89 countries
over the period 1981-2014 and after accounting for a range of confounding variables and
the possibility of reverse causality, supports this hypothesis.
regression does not mean that the marginal effect is not significant for substantively relevant values of
the mediating variable, as this depends on the sign of the covariance between our variables of interest
(Brambor et al., 2006). The relevant range of Gini values is given by the sample distribution.
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